Commentary for Bava Kamma 57:16

אלא מאי בשעת נפילה אף בשעת נפילה וקמשמע לן כדאביי

But how can you prove this?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' That the points at issue are twofold. ');">¹⁴</span> — From the text which presents two [independent] cases [as follows]; SOMEONE SLIPPED IN THE WATER OR WAS INJURED BY THE POTSHERD; for indeed is not one case the same as the other,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Why then would one case not have sufficed? ');">¹⁵</span> unless it was intended to convey, 'Someone slipped in the water while the pitcher had been falling<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And the water was still in the process of being poured out. ');">¹⁶</span> or was injured by the potsherd subsequently to the fall.' Now that the Mishnah presents two independent cases, it is only reasonable to assume that the Baraitha<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Supra p. 152. ');">¹⁷</span> similarly deals with the same two problems. That is all very well as regards the 'pitcher' where the two [problems] have application [in the case of damage done] at the time of the fall or subsequently to the fall [respectively]. But how in the case of the 'camel'? For though concerning damage occasioned subsequently to the fall, it may well have application where the carcass has been abandoned,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The point at issue thus consisting in the law applicable to abandoned nuisances. ');">¹⁸</span> yet in the case of damage done at the time of the fall, what point of difference can be found?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For the problem whether 'stumbling' implies negligence or not has surely no application where it was not the driver but the camel that stumbled. ');">¹⁹</span> — R. Aha thereupon said: [It deals with a case] where the camel was led in water along the slippery shore of a river.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The stumbling of the camel is thus imputed to the driver. ');">²⁰</span> But under what circumstances? If where there was another [better] way, is it not a case of culpa lata?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., grave fault, which has nothing to do with the problem of stumbling. ');">²¹</span> If on the other hand there was no other way [to pass through], is it not a case of no alternative? — The point at issue can therefore only be where the driver stumbled and together with him the camel also stumbled. But in the case of abandoning nuisances,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Which is the second point at issue between R. Judah and R. Meir. ');">²²</span> where could [the condition of] intention [laid down by R. Judah] come in? — Said R. Joseph: The intention [in this case] refers to the retaining of the ownership of the potsherd.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [R. Judah therefore means this: If he had the intention of retaining the shards he is liable; if he had no intention to do so but abandoned them, he is exempt.] ');">²³</span> So also said R. Ashi, that the intention [in this case] refers to the retaining of the ownership of the potsherd. R. Eleazar said: 'It is regarding damage done at the time of the fall that there is a difference of opinion.' But how in the case of damage done subsequently to the fall? Would there be unanimity that there is exemption? Surely there is R. Meir who expressed [his opinion]<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Supra p. 152. ');">²⁴</span> that there is liability! What else [would you suggest? That in this case] there is unanimity [imposing] liability? Surely there are the Rabbis who stated [their view] that there is exemption! — Hence, what he means [to convey by his statement] 'damage done at the time of the fall', is that there is difference of opinion 'even regarding damage done at the time of the fall', making thus known to us [the conclusions arrived at] by Abaye.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Supra p. 153. ');">²⁵</span>

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